When I teach monetary economics, one of the topics I discuss is coexistence of money and higher-return assets. My list of potentially serious explanations includes (i) a structure of Shapley-Shubik trading posts that gives a special role to one object (see Krishna [1] for an argument that a structure of posts that favors a low rate-of-return object is not robust); (ii) Zhu-Wallace [6] , which, as carefully described by Lagos, divides the gains from trade in pairwise meetings between buyers and sellers in a way that can favor the holding of a low rate-of-return object; and (iii) the possibility that the higher-return assets are counterfeits (see, for example, Li et. al. [4] ). Here, after setting out the Lagos idea in a simple way, I explain why I will not add it to this list.
Because the main idea applies to any model, I set it out against the background of the alternating-endowments model (see [5] ). There is one good per discrete date, a unit measure of people, and each person maximizes expected discounted utility of consumption with discount factor 2 (0; 1) and period utility function u : R ++ ! R, where u is twice di¤erentiable and u 00 < 0 < u 0 . Half the people have endowment stream (y h ; y l ; y h ; :::) and half have endowment stream (y l ; y h ; y l ; :::), where y h > y l > 0. I also assume that the equation u(y h s) = u(y l + s) has a postive solution for s, denoted s . (To make money essential in this model, assume that people cannot commit to future actions and that there is no monitoring in the sense that a person's actions at one date cannot be associated with that person in the future.)
Suppose there is a positive and …xed stock of uniform divisible money, denoted M , initially owned in equal amounts by the people with y l and that there is spot price-taking trade at each date of the good for money. Under the above conditions, there is an equilibrium in which s=M is the positive and constant price per unit of money, an equilibrium with (c h ; c l ) = (y h s ; y l + s ), where the …rst (second) component is consumption of people with y h (y l ). Now, instead of having a …xed stock of uniform money, suppose at date 3 and only at date 3, the government sells some one-period (pure discount bonds), with each unit of the bond being a claim to one unit of something at the beginning of date 4. (There is no uncertainty and this action is fully anticipated.) If the something is the uniform money, then the bonds sell at face value-the analogue of Proposition 1 in Lagos (see page 9). Suppose, instead, that the uniform money is green and that the bonds are claims to uniform red money in aggregate amount B > 0. Now, for given M and B, let ( ; M 0 ) 2 R 2 ++ be such that M = B + M 0 . It is easy to con…rm that for each such ( ; M 0 ), there is an equilibrium that supports (c h ; c l ) and in which the aggregate value at date 3 of the bonds in terms of green money is M M 0 . (Notice that is an exchange rate and that this is a version of exchange-rate indeterminacy, as Lagos remarks at the end of footnote 18 on page 18.)
Although it seems a bit odd to call B=(M M 0 ) the gross yield on bondsthe units are red money at t+1 per unit of green money at t-this is what Lagos does. Obviously, if is high, near M=B, then the yield is low; if is near zero, then the yield is high. This is the analogue of the main indeterminacy result, proposition 2 in Lagos (see page 15).
The interpretion favored by Lagos is that money consists of notes that are distinguished by their serial numbers, not their colors. However, as Lagos says, coexistence of money and higher-return assets is a pervasive phenomenon. Therefore, if we are to take Lagos's model seriously as an explanation, then we should see the analogue of 6 = 1 as a pervasive phenomenon. That is, we should see the value of notes depend on their serial numbers. In the U.S., at least, this almost never happens. That is why I will not add Lagos to my list of serious explanations of coexistence of money and higher-return assets.
Of course, serial numbers are sometimes used-to trace stolen currency, ransoms, counterfeits, and other illegal activities. But, such e¤orts aside, the Fed and the Treasury work to insure that serial numbers, the ages of di¤erent notes, do not matter. Indeed, they exchange worn units for new units at par. Of course, serial numbers could be used. We could have negative lotteries based on serial numbers and, thereby, prevent the costless storage of currency from interfering with the attainment of negative nominal interest rates (see Mankiew [3] ). And we could combine positive and negative lotteries to attain the same end and at the same time appeal to the public's readiness to engage in gambles with negative expected returns. But, none of these uses of serial numbers requires the kind of theorizing set out by Lagos.
